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Value: An Analytic Assessment 
of “Dumping” in DRAMS 
Kenneth Flamm 
Since the mid-l970s,  the concept of  sales at a cost less than a constructed 
“fair value” has become an alternative standard for findings under the U.S. 
trade laws that imports are being “dumped” in the U.S. market.’ It has been 
estimated that, since 1980, about 60 percent of  all dumping cases have been 
based  on charges of selling at a price below  some constructed average cost 
(Horlick  1989, 136). Perhaps the most widely publicized  application of  this 
standard can be found in the case of imports of the largest category (by value) 
of  semiconductor  device  sold,  dynamic  random  access  memory  (DRAM) 
chips. A U.S. firm’s petition for relief from dumping, brought against Japa- 
nese  64,000-bit (64K) DRAM  imports  in  1985, specifically  acknowledges 
that prices for these chips in the U.S.  market may actually have been margin- 
ally higher than prevailing prices in the Japanese market, the exact opposite 
of the traditional concept of dumping as sales abroad at less than home market 
prices.2  Instead, the U.S. complainant charged that Japanese chips were being 
sold at prices not covering the full costs of production, the new definition of 
dumping in the U.S.  trade laws. 
The investigation of DRAM dumping was expanded by the U.S. govern- 
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ment to include 256K and  1  megabit (1M) DRAMS and, folded into investi- 
gations of U.S. industry charges of dumping of  erasable programmable  read 
only  memory  (EPROM) chips,  ultimately  culminated  in  the  controversial 
U.S  .-Japan Semiconductor Trade  Arrangement  (STA) of  1986. One of  the 
outcomes of the STA was a system of floor prices for Japanese DRAM and 
EPROM imports administered by the U.S. Commerce Department, based on 
the calculation of  something  called “foreign market value”  (FMV), derived 
from the “fair value”-constructed  cost comparisons enshrined in the dumping 
provisions of U. S. trade law. 
Although the FMV calculations have been dropped from the 199  1 successor 
to the STA, Japanese producers  are required to continue to collect the same 
data, in order to facilitate a “fast response” dumping investigation. Thus, one 
may surmise that the implicit threat of  a dumping investigation continua to 
give the FMV calculation  a  significant-if  shadowy-role  in  determining 
lower bounds on pricing of Japanese chip exports to U.S. (and possibly third- 
country) markets. 
While the idea of requiring producers always to maintain a price at or above 
some concept of full long-run average cost is hard to defend, either as a posi- 
tive description of what a profit-maximizing producer in a “competitive” mar- 
ket would choose to do or as a normative guide for efficient resource alloca- 
tion, it is possible to construct an economically coherent argument that pricing 
below marginal cost can serve as a warning signal of  “strategic” behavior by 
producers  that in some circumstances can justify  policy intervention by the 
government. However, in an industry subject to so-called learning economies 
(where unit production cost falls with cumulative production experience), it is 
possible that producers may rationally choose to “forward price,” that is, sell 
at a price below current marginal cost, for completely “competitive,” nonstra- 
tegic reasons. 
Is below-marginal-cost pricing for nonstrategic reasons empirically relevant 
in the semiconductor industry? Is it reasonable to defend even some revised 
version  of a constructed cost test for dumping, based on a constructed mar- 
ginal cost, as a reasonable trip wire for government scrutiny of possible stra- 
tegic behavior by foreign producers? Perhaps the most interesting question is, 
What can we deduce about the relation between  price and production  costs 
using a minimally realistic model of the product life cycle when large up-front 
investments  in  capacity  constrain output, large  and relatively  fixed  invest- 
ments  in  research  and development  (R&D) create economies of  scale, and 
learning economies are likely to be significant? How is an “FMV-like” system 
likely to constrain producer behavior in these circumstances?  Because these 
characteristics  are typical  not just of  semiconductor  manufacture  but  of  a 
broad range of high-technology  products, the answers to these questions, and 
the methodology used in the inquiry, are of some importance. 
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used to compare the time path of output and prices in a nonstrategic, compet- 
itive (open-loop Cournot-Nash equilibrium) semiconductor industry with var- 
ious variants  of  constructed  “fair value”  that  would  be  associated  with the 
same path for output. The model is applied with empirically based parameters 
associated with  1M DRAM chip production, in order to explore how pricing 
of  semiconductors is likely to be constrained, over the product life cycle, by 
constructed  values-FMV-type  pricing rules.  The basic  model should also 
prove useful in analyzing many other interesting questions about the potential 
effect of  public policies affecting high-technology  industries with scale and 
learning economies. 
3.1  Economic Rationality of Below-Marginal-Cost Pricing 
To a first approximation, stripped of a variety of practically important cost 
allocation and accounting  issues, the U.S. Commerce  Department’s  proce- 
dures for constructing FMVs resemble an economist’s concept of average cost 
of  production, plus a fixed 8 percent markup that ostensibly reflects “normal” 
profit.  (This completely arbitrary 8 percent markup is ignored in further dis- 
cussion.)  A result taught  in most any introductory economics course is the 
fact that, under some circumstances (e.g., a downturn in demand), it can be 
economically rational for a producer in a competitive industry to sell at a price 
less than full average cost, just as long as short-run marginal cost is covered 
by  price.  As long  as a firm at least covers the variable  costs of running  a 
production line and the marginal cost of producing an incremental unit on that 
line, it makes economic sense to continue operating a factory, even if revenues 
received are insufficient to recover the full historical cost of an initial invest- 
ment in developing the product and building the factory. 
Thus, most economists would find it entirely normal that over at least some 
periods, observed prices would fall short of the full (long-run) average cost of 
prod~ction.~  Any policy measure that prohibits marginal cost pricing by for- 
eign exporters, while leaving domestic producers unaffected, will-if  it actu- 
ally affects market outcomes-increase  domestic production at the expense of 
domestic  consumers  and  (possibly) foreign producers.  It will also arguably 
deny foreign producers national treatment,  forbidding them the right to eco- 
nomic behavior permitted domestic firms. 
If  price falls short of the full average cost of  production  continuously,  of 
course, one may safely predict that some firms will exit the industry and that 
the industry will shrink to the point that full average costs are at least recov- 
ered over the life of sunk investments by the remaining firms. Thus, if  sus- 
tained constructed “fair value” dumping (pricing below long-run average cost) 
is observed in a competitive industry, one may generally infer that excess ca- 
3. For further elaboration on this point, see, e.g.,  DeardorB(l989, 30-33). 50  Kenneth Flamm 
pacity exists and that exit will follow. But observed pricing behavior may still 
reflect “normal,” competitive behavior on the part of the firms pricing below 
FMVs. 
Can one imagine any economic justification for remedial policies triggered 
by selling below  a constructed FMV? The point at which many economists 
would agree that something other than “competitive,” nonstrategic behavior 
might be suspected is when a firm’s price falls short of  its short-run marginal 
cost or, even more obviously, average variable cost (which bounds short-run 
marginal cost from below over the relevant range).4 
In considering why  a firm might  rationally choose to produce and sell a 
product at a price not covering the current marginal cost of  production,  it is 
helpful to distinguish  between “strategic”  and nonstrategic behavior. I shall 
label a firm’s behavior “strategic”  when it explicitly takes account of effects 
of its decisions on the behavior of other economic agents. This contrasts with 
what I will call “nonstrategic”  behavior, decisions taken considering the ac- 
tions or choices of other agents as fixed, unaffected by one’s own. 
One possible explanation for producers pricing below marginal cost, con- 
sistent  with  nonstrategic  behavior,  is that  current  production  may  lower  a 
firm’s future production  costs. In this case, measured current marginal cost 
overstates  “true” marginal  cost, which  should  take  into account  the  cost- 
reducing effects of current production on future outp~t.~ 
But another possible explanation for behavior of this sort is a strategic mo- 
tive on the part of the “dumper”: either predation (actions intended to encour- 
age other firms to exit from the industry), limit pricing (intended to discourage 
entry by others), or a defensive response against predatory behavior by oth- 
ers.6 In this case, the rents received from the exercise of monopoly power later 
must  be  forthcoming to justify  absorption  of  a  temporary  loss  on output 
shipped now. 
Many  forms of  strategic behavior  by  firms,  like predation,  are regulated 
within a national market by antitrust laws. Thus, a constructed cost test, used 
4.  For  a detailed  survey of  the literature  on tests  for predatory  behavior, see Ordover and 
Saloner (1989, 579-90). 
5. Note that such learning economies can also be used as a strategic instrument, with a firm’s 
production decisions taking into account the effect of its learning on the actions of its rivals. For 
such a model,  see Fudenberg and Tirole (1983). Deardo&  (1989, 37-38)  points out that low- 
priced sales designed to build brand loyalty or otherwise alter consumer preferences might also 
rationally lead a producer to sacrifice current profitability for future rents and price below marginal 
cost. In effect, greater current output shifts future demand schedules, and current marginal reve- 
nue understates “true” marginal revenue. Such “demand-side learning effects,” however, may be 
considered a form of “strategic” behavior since they are designed to alter the behavioral response 
to price of other economic agents (i.e., consumers). 
6. The modem rehabilitation of  the theory of  predation focuses on its effect on rival  firms’ 
expectations about future profitability: as an exit-inducing investment in  “disinformation” about 
the predator’s cost structure, e.g., or as the consequence  of  asymmetric financial constraints 
among competing  firms created by  imperfections in  capital markets.  The basic references are 
Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Kreps and Wilson (1982); useful interpretations are found in 
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in the framework of the dumping laws, might be interpreted as a second-best 
attempt to remedy behavior by foreign firms that, if carried out on a purely 
domestic basis,  would be considered the domain of  antitrust policy, Lacking 
the ability to impose domestic policy  standards on a foreign firm’s behavior 
outside the national market, a national government can instead impose con- 
trols on the manifestations of that behavior-that  is, pricing of  sales to im- 
porters-in  the domestic market. 
Since, absent learning effects, pricing below short-run marginal cost is suf- 
ficient (but not necessary)’  to conclude that a firm is acting strategically in its 
pricing policies,  it may seem reasonable at that point to review its activities 
and to take corrective action if  the intent is deemed to be predation  and the 
potential effect significant. It is at least possible that increased monopoly rents 
paid  out later by  national consumers  to foreign producers,  and deadweight 
losses, could more than offset the windfall to national consumers created by a 
temporary episode of low import prices, justifying  some policy intervention 
(as noted by Deardorff [ 1989, 35-36]). 
From this point of view, the economic problem with cost-based definitions 
of dumping is not necessarily their existence but their use of the wrong cost 
concept  (long-run  average  cost  instead  of  short-run  marginal  cost)  as  the 
prima facie trigger for consideration of possible intervention. This perspective 
also leads one to  focus on the close relation between “fair trade”  laws and 
competition and antitrust policy. It might be argued that some binding inter- 
national  standards for competitive business behavior (and their enforcement) 
might be offered as a constructive alternative to national  fair value dumping 
tests based on constructed costs, as remedies for predation. 
This paper will  not  attempt  to evaluate  whether predation  is a plausible 
description of what was going on in the DRAM marketplace in the 1980s. I 
merely  note that predatory behavior was one of the allegations made by  the 
U.S. industry in pressing its case for protection. However, the modem theory 
of  predation has been interpreted to suggest that high-technology  industries 
are particularly important places to look for such behavior.8 
3.2  Costs and Pricing in the Semiconductor Industry 
High-technology industries, facing large sunk costs in research and devel- 
opment relative to sales, along with highly capital-intensive industries, are by 
nature particularly prone to trade friction involving charges of dumping based 
7. Criticism of  a short-run marginal cost test for predation generally argues that the rule is not 
stringent enough; prices above short-run marginal cost may still be associated with socially costly 
predatory activity (see Tirole 1988, 372-3;  Ordover and Saloner 1989, 579-80). 
8. Paul Milgrom argues that “policymakers should be especially sensitive to predatory pricing 
in growing, technologically  advanced  industries,  where the temptation to  discourage entry  is 
large, and the costs of  curtailed entry even larger” (1987, 938). For further consideration of  the 
plausibility of  strategic behavior in semiconductor competition. see Flamm (in press, b). 52  Kenneth Flamm 
on constructed cost tests.  When fixed  investments  in R&D or factories are 
very large in relation to a firm’s sales, a significant gap between average vari- 
able cost and long-run  average cost will exist, and short-run marginal  cost 
may fall significantly below long-run  average cost for a substantial range of 
economically rational output levels. In such a case, perfectly competitive be- 
havior may often trigger pricing below long-run average cost-and  dumping 
charges-in  a downturn. 
High-tech industries are also particularly  prone to dumping cases because 
of  the peculiar way in which R&D investments are treated by trade law (and 
many companies’) accounting principles.  An investment in a capital facility, 
for example, is not charged immediately against company revenues when con- 
struction is begun, or completed, but spread over the period in which it is to 
be used through the use of depreciation charges. One may argue that account- 
ing depreciation  is at least an attempt to approximate the profile of  true eco- 
nomic depreciation charges. An R&D investment, by way of contrast, is gen- 
erally charged against revenues at the moment it is incurred, not spread over 
its economically useful life. 
It is sometimes argued that, when processed through constructed cost cal- 
culations, this  “front  loading”  of  R&D leads to artificially high  prices  for 
high-tech  imports (like DRAMS) when  initially  shipped, in effect retarding 
technological  progress.  Defenders  of  this  practice  argue that,  since  R&D 
charges  are often  allocated  on the basis of  sales rather  than identified  with 
some particular  product, the practical effect is to spread R&D charges over 
generations of  products, through time (although it clearly remains true that a 
company just entering an industry after making a fixed R&D investment will 
necessarily have to charge an initially high price). 
The semiconductor industry is both technology intensive and capital inten- 
sive: it spends almost 15 percent of  sales on R&D; it also typically spends an 
even larger fraction of sales (15-20  percent annually) on capital investments. 
Demand for semiconductors is also notoriously cyclical, and it is not, there- 
fore, surprising to find that constructed cost tests for dumping were invoked 
in the 1985 industry downturn. 
In  addition, semiconductor production  is believed  to be characterized  by 
so-called  learning  economies.  Unit  production  costs  are  believed  to  fall 
sharply  with  accumulated production  experience. This further complicates 
our discussion  of  the borderline  between  nonstrategic  pricing behavior  and 
strategic activities. The key result due to Spence (1981) is that, with learning 
economies but  no strategic  interactions  with its rivals,  a rational  firm will 
generally equate marginal revenue to a value below its current short-run mar- 
ginal cost of  production, as it takes  into account the cost-reducing effect of 
current production on future production costs. 
While the Spence model is rather unsuitable for analyzing production deci- 
sions in the semiconductor industry, the point it makes greatly complicates the 
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short-run marginal cost rather than long-run average cost as the trip wire for 
possible intervention-can  be justified as a reasonable safeguard against pred- 
ation by foreign producers.  For in the Spence model, even with nonstrategic 
behavior-that  is, with a firm taking production decisions by competitors as 
given, independent of its actions-economically  rational firms will engage in 
“forward pricing,” that is, choose output levels where marginal revenue lies 
below their current short-run marginal cost. 
3.3  Modeling the Semiconductor Product Life Cycle 
In my somewhat stylized depiction of the industry, a DRAM producer will 
be assumed to produce a homogeneous commodity, perfectly substitutable for 
that of other  producer^.^ Difficult issues concerning the timing of  the switch- 
over from one generation  of DRAM to another, and intergenerational exter- 
nalities,  are ignored by assuming that a DRAM producer faces a fixed period 
over which the DRAM is sold and that costs for developing and producing his 
product are relevant to that generation of DRAM alone. The product life cycle 
begins at time 0 and ends at time 1 (hence, the unit of time is the “product life 
cycle”). Every producer faces revenue function R,  giving total revenues at any 
moment t as a function of his own production, y(t),  and the aggregate output 
of all other producers, ~(t).  All revenues and costs are measured in constant 
dollar terms. Following  Spence, for simplicity, I ignore discounting  on the 
grounds  that  product  life  cycles are short (typically,  a  new  generation  of 
DRAM is introduced every three years) and the additional complexity intro- 
duced by discounting over time substantial. 
In semiconductor production, plant capacity may be measured in terms of 
“wafer starts,” the number of slices of silicon, on which integrated circuits are 
etched, that can be processed per unit time. At any moment t, w[E(t)]  func- 
tioning chips are yielded per wafer processed, where w is an increasing func- 
tion of E(t),  “experience” through time t. How one defines relevant “experi- 
ence” is a subject explored below. I will parametrize the effect of output, y, on 
relevant experience, E,  as 
where K is capacity, and y is a parameter taking on a value between zero and 
one. For notational simplicity, time will sometimes be suppressed as an argu- 
ment of time-varying variables. 
Some of the variable cost of  producing a chip is incurred with every wafer 
processed, and some of  the cost  is incurred only with good, yielded chips 
(assembly and final test, e.g.). If a wafer-processing facility is utilized at rate 
9. This is not an unreasonable approximation. For more detailed discussion of  this issue in the 
context of semiconductor price indexes, see Flamm (in press, a). 54  Kenneth Flamm 
u(t)  (u between 0 and l),  total variable costs at any moment are dy + cuK; d 
is manufacturing cost per good, yielded chip,  c processing cost per  wafer 
start. Note that y(t,  K) = w[E(t)]u(t)K. 
Up-front, sunk costs independent of output levels (like R&D) are equal to 
E  and fixed capital investment costs required for a facility processing K wafer 
starts are equal to r per wafer start. For the moment, take K (wafer-processing 
capacity) as a given. The producer’s problem is to maximize 
Y 
K’l 
s.t.  E  = -  = w[E(t)]u(t)K’-Y. 
Firms will be  assumed to  simultaneously choose initial capacity invest- 
ments K  and a time path for utilization rates,  which give rise to a path for 
output over time, which they then proceed to follow. My assumption that ca- 
pacity investments in DRAMs are committed at the beginning of the product 
cycle is not terribly unrealistic: it typically takes a year or more to get a new 
fabrication facility up and running, and a new generation of DRAM is intro- 
duced roughly every three years.  lo 
For the moment, take y to equal zero (i.e., absolute cumulative production 
is the relevant measure of experience). The model that I present in appendix 
A will, like the Spence model, assume a Nash equilibrium in output paths; 
that is, given rivals’ actual choices of output paths, (1) is maximized by every 
firm. Firms’ behavior in this static game is nonstrategic since they take their 
rivals’ output choices as given.” 
3.3.1  Spence’s Model 
If wafer-processing capacity K is not fixed over the life cycle but is contin- 
uously variable, as is implicit in Spence’s formulation, then we have a special 
case of the above model in which r is zero (capital costs are included in wafer- 
10. The world record for bringing a new fabrication facility on line seems to be held by  NMB 
Semiconductor, which claims that it took only nine months to go from initial ground breaking for 
a new factory to initial production of 256K DRAMs in 1985 (see Waller 1988). 
11. An alternative would be to set up a two-stage competition among rival firms, with capacity 
investment as the initial phase, followed by  a second stage in which firms choose output paths 
subject to capacity constraints. The solution of the static game presented here corresponds to the 
open-loop (nonstrategic) equilibrium of this two-stage game, in which a firm’s first-period choice 
of capacity takes its rivals’ choices in both periods as given. An alternative equilibrium concept 
would assume second-period subgame perfectness, i.e., that firms take into account the effect of 
their first-period capacity choices on their rivals’ second-period output paths. This creates snare- 
gic interactions among firms (see Dixit 1986, 114; Shapiro 1989, 383-86). Flamm (in press, b) 
extends the model presented in this paper to include strategic capacity investments by firms. Note 
that, despite its nonstrategic nature, the present model is developed using the conjectural varia- 
tions framework-which  (somewhat controversially) permits strategic behavior-to  allow greater 
generality in its application and to preserve comparability with the Baldwin-Krugman model. 55  An Analytic Assessment of “Dumping” in DRAMS 
processing cost c and some arbitrary initial scale for capacity K is set), cap- 
ital  is  a  completely  variable  input,  and  a  producer  is  free  to choose  any 
nonnegative  u-that  is, u  is unbounded  above,  not  bounded  by  one-and 
produce  any yielded  chip output desired. Under these circumstances,  as is 
easily shown in appendix  A, formal maximization  of objective function (1) 
yields the first-order condition 
that is, u is chosen so that marginal revenue is set equal to current marginal 
cost (d + dw) less  a term proportional  to nonnegative  adjoint  variable  6, 
which captures the future cost-reducing effects of current production. Adjoint 
variable 6, in turn, is determined by the transversality condition, 
(3)  6(1) = 0, 
and equation of motion, 
By differentiating both sides of equation (2) with respect to time, we immedi- 
ately see that marginal revenue, R,, must be constant over time and therefore, 
by  (3), equal to current marginal cost at the end of  the product cycle, d + 
c/w[E( l)]. 
In short, with continuously variable capacity, a profit-maximizing producer 
will choose his output so that marginal revenue equals his terminal (not cur- 
rent!) marginal cost. This is so-called forward pricing. With a constant elastic- 
ity and autonomous demand, a constant price proportional  to terminal mar- 
ginal cost will result. 
Now this does not necessarily mean that price falls below current marginal 
cost since price will in general exceed marginal revenue. Whether constructed 
“fair values” based on current marginal cost will serve as binding constraints 
on pricing  will depend on many factors, including market structure and the 
elasticity of industry demand. 
While this model provides an appealing explanation of the phenomenon of 
forward pricing, a notable empirical  feature of  business practice within the 
semiconductor industry,  the  actual  trajectory  of  pricing  suggested  by  this 
model (with a constant elasticity demand, price is fixed at some constant level 
over the entire product cycle) is quite inconsistent with observed behavior.  I* 
Chip prices typically drop very quickly over the first part of the product cycle, 
drop less quickly as the product approaches maturity, and fall very slowly, if 
12. Dick (1991). e.g.,  invokes the Spence model to motivate his assumptions about the time 
path of semiconductor prices over the product life cycle but ignores the constant pricing prediction 
of the Spence model. 56  Kenneth Flamm 
at all, at the end. As shall be seen in a moment, a more realistic treatment of 
capacity constraints yields a more plausible trajectory for prices. 
3.3.2  The Baldwin-Krugman Approach 
The pioneering  attempt to incorporate  learning economies into a stylized, 
empirical model of  the semiconductor industry is that of Baldwin and Krug- 
man (B-K) (1988).13 The B-K focuses on regional segmentation of  the U.S. 
and Japanese semiconductor markets, in order to simulate the effect of market 
closure policies,  and takes an approach to producer behavior that differs sig- 
nificantly from that of Spence. B-K constrain firms to operate at full capacity 
over the entire product cycle; the choice variable for the firm is initial capacity, 
which, once set, determines output levels over the entire product life cycle. 
The first-order condition for an optimum is that the life-cycle revenue created 
from the addition of  a marginal unit of wafer-processing capacity just equals 
the cost of building and operating that marginal unit of wafer-processing ca- 
pacity (since all capacity is always fully utilized, the distinction I am drawing 
between investment costs and wafer-processing costs is immaterial). 
Firms in the Spence model are never capacity constrained; firms in the B-K 
model always operate at their capacity constraint. The Spence model has firms 
forward pricing-maintaining  marginal revenue constant over the life cycle, 
equal to their terminal marginal cost. The B-K model has marginal revenue- 
and price-falling  smoothly over the life cycle. Thus, while the striking for- 
ward pricing behavior of  the Spence model has disappeared, a more empiri- 
cally plausible path for prices has replaced it. 
As Krishna (1988) notes, however, the algebraic tractability created by the 
simplicity of  the B-K  specification of  firm behavior has been purchased  by 
excluding the possibility of  some interesting forms of strategic competition. 
(Because B-K empirically  calibrate conjectural  variations,  strategic interac- 
tions among firms exist.) Investments  in capacity  may  be undertaken  with 
strategic objectives, to convince rivals to exit or dissuade them from entering 
an industry, creating additional monopoly  power that can then be exploited. 
Constraining firms to operate at full capacity over the entire product life cycle 
may restrict them to suboptimal output paths, where monopoly power is not 
fully exploited. It also hinders analysis of interesting policy questions regard- 
ing the potential welfare effect of  strategic government policies that may fos- 
ter the creation and exercise of monopoly power. 
A variant of the B-K model can be fit into the framework outlined above for 
the Spence model, after suitable amendments. Utilization rate u is constrained 
13. A somewhat different exposition of this model is given in Helpman and Krugman (H-K) 
(1989, chap.  8). This later interpretation differs in some significant respects from B-K. For ex- 
ample, the learning curve in B-K has yields improving with cumulative wafers processed  (i.e,, 
faulty  chips have the  same yield-enhancing effects  as good ones), while H-K presents  a more 
conventional view of the learning curve, with yield rates rising with cumulative output of yielded 
(i.e.,  good) chips. While the B-K assumption on yields is not the accepted approach to modeling 
yield improvement within the industry, it simplifies the mathematical  structure of the model. 57  An Analytic Assessment of “Dumping” in DRAMS 
to equal one at all times, and objective function (1) is maximized with respect 
to K  alone The right-hand side of equation (4) is replaced by the more com- 
plex variant shown in appendix A (corresponding to u  = l),  and a new ques- 
tion determining optimal capacity choice is added: 
where the B-K specification fixes u equal to one and y equal to zero. 
3.3.3  A More Realistic Model of the Semiconductor Product Cycle 
It is possible to create a more realistic model of  firm behavior,  in which 
firms can continuously adjust output, as in the Spence model, yet also face 
capacity constraints on output, as in the B-K model. 
I briefly summarize the more detailed exposition laid out in appendix A to 
this paper. The firm’s problem is to maximize (1) by choosing both an initial 
level of capacity K and time-varying utilization rates u(t)  for that capacity that 
determine output at any moment in time. The optimal level of capacity chosen 
satisfies equation (5) above; the left-hand side of this equation can be inter- 
preted as the net marginal return on additional investment in capacity. It also 
must be true that the optimal path must be capacity constrained over some 
interval (i.e., u[t] = 1). 
In general, the optimal path for u(t)  will be made up of three types of seg- 
ments:  interior  segments,  where  0 > u > 1;  lower-boundary  segments, 
where u  = 0; and upper-boundary segments, where u  =  1. Within an inte- 
rior segment, equations (2) and (4) will hold, as in the Spence model, as will 
a form of forward pricing: marginal revenue will be held constant, set equal 
to current marginal cost less GIKY-the  marginal cost-reducing value (over the 
remainder of  the product  life cycle) of  an additional unit of output-at  the 
endpoint of this interval. 
With additional assumptions, one can further sharpen the characterization 
of  the optimal behavior of a profit-maximizing firm. I shall assume a symme- 
tric industry equilibrium with N identical firms, an autonomous demand (i.e., 
not an explicit function of time), and concavity of  total industry revenues in 
industry output (as would be the case, e.g., with a constant elasticity demand 
function and price elasticity exceeding unity). Although a nonstrategic, Nash 
equilibrium in output paths is assumed  for the remainder  of this paper,  for 
expositional purposes I will parametrize  a firm’s perceptions of other firms’ 
reactions to changes in its output in terms of a constant, nonnegative conjec- 
tural variation.  (The two interesting cases that motivate this parametrization 
are Cournot-Nash equilibrium [conjectural variation equal to zero] and a col- 
lusive, constant market share cartel [conjectural variation equal to N - 1 .)I4 
14. The major behavioral assumption excluded by  a nonnegative conjectural variation is Ber- 
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Under these assumptions, optimal u must decline over an interior segment, 
and u must be continuous in time. Therefore, the optimal path of the utiliza- 
tion rate must look like an upper-boundary  segment, possibly followed by an 
interior  segment,  possibly  then  followed  by  a  lower-boundary  segment. 
Along lower-boundary  segments, where u  = 0, 6 will be constant and there- 
fore equal to its terminal  value. Thus, the Spence forward pricing result of 
marginal revenue being set equal to terminal marginal cost will hold whenever 
we are producing but are not capacity constrained (i.e., 0 < u < 1, along an 
interior segment). 
If we further assume that firm marginal revenue exceeds the initial value of 
current marginal cost (so some production will always be profitable) as indus- 
try output approaches zero (as must be the case with a constant elasticity de- 
mand), wc can exclude the possibility of lower-boundary segments occurring 
along the optimal path. Note that nothing about the specific shape of the learn- 
ing  curve  (function  w) beyond  the fact  that  it  is  increasing  in  experience 
(w, > 0) has been  assumed in  arriving  at  this  characterization  of  optimal 
policy. 
In  short,  with  this  simple description  of  the  semiconductor  product  life 
cycle, we derive a more realistic  specification of firm behavior that captures 
both the importance of capacity investments and the ability of firms fully to 
exploit  what  monopoly  power  they  enjoy  by  varying  utilization  rates  over 
time. It is simple enough to be empirically tractable.  Firms will make some 
capacity investment,  run at that capacity full blast for some period of  time, 
then possibly switch to a constant output path (with constant marginal revenue 
but decreasing utilization of capacity as yields rise) over the remainder of the 
product life cycle. 
3.4  Preliminary Observations 
Even with its relatively general structure, the analysis presented above pro- 
vides a couple of insights into the question of  “dumping” over the product life 
cycle. First, below-current-marginal-cost  pricing will never be observed near 
the  end  of  the  product  cycle  among  competitive,  nonstrategic,  profit- 
maximizing firms. This follows immediately from the fact that, if any output 
is being produced, marginal revenue will never be less than the right-hand side 
of equation (2) (see app. A), which at time 1-the  end of the product cycle- 
equals current marginal  cost (d + d~).  Since price exceeds marginal reve- 
nue, price must also exceed current marginal cost in  some neighborhood of 
time 1, the end of the product cycle. 
well-developed  secondary spot markets, specifying that producers sell at a single market price and 
choose quantities sold is the natural assumption. Moreover,  Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) have 
shown that, in a two-stage game, where first-stage capacity investments are followed by a second- 
stage Bertrand game in prices and a particular (“efficient”) rationing rule, the outcome is a Cour- 
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3.4.1  Closing the Model 
Can we say anything about the relation between price and long-run average 
cost? The model sketched out thus far takes the number of firms in the indus- 
try-which  will affect profitability and pricing-as  given. One “natural” way 
to close the model is to specify that firms enter the industry until rents earned 
by producers, that is, the integrand in equation (l),  just equal zero. The zero- 
profit condition then determines N,  the number of  firms entering the industry 
(I will ignore the difficulties created by insisting that N be an integer). 
Zero profits  mean that total  life-cycle revenues just equal total life-cycle 
costs. Therefore (after dividing both concepts by total output over the product 
life cycle) average “life-cycle” price must equal average “life-cycle’’ cost per 
unit. 
But is there any clear relation between current price and current “fully al- 
located‘’ average cost at any given moment? Current short-run marginal cost 
(SRMC) is a relatively clear concept: the additional current cost saved by pro- 
ducing one less unit at any given moment. This is the incremental cost saved 
when output is reduced by one unit.15 In my model, currect short-run marginal 
cost--d  + c/w-is  constant at any moment and equal to current average var- 
iable cost. 
To define a current average cost, however, it is first necessary to define an 
intertemporal  cost  allocation  rule to spread fixed  entry  costs F  and capital 
costs rK over the product life cycle. Dividing the capital and entry costs allo- 
cated to some instant  in  time by  output  produced  at that  moment  yields a 
current average fixed cost per unit produced. If this current average fixed cost 
is added to current average variable cost (identical to short-run marginal cost 
in my model), we have a long-run average cost (LRAC) concept that satisfies 
the basic requirements of a long-run average cost: when multiplied by output 
at that moment and summed over all moments, total costs of  production over 
the entire product life cycle are given. 
Now,  because my assumption about entry means that total life-cycle costs 
are exactly equal to total  life-cycle  revenues,  price  less the fully  allocated 
long-run average cost defined above (i.e., profit per unit), multiplied by out- 
put, and summed over every moment of the product  cycle must be exactly 
equal to zero. Thus, if price exceeds the fully allocated average cost concept 
at any instant, it must fall below fully allocated average cost at some other 
instant over the product  cycle, and vice versa. Therefore, if  my assumption 
that  entry drives  long-run  profits  to zero is a  realistic  one, below-LRAC 
“dumping” must be occurring sometime during the product cycle, unless the 
cost allocation rule for fixed costs defines an average fixed cost that, when 
added to current average variable cost, is exactly equal to actual price ar  every 
moment. 
15. When a firm operates at less than full capacity, this is identical to the increased cost incurred 
in producing one more unit. When operating at full capacity, the incremental cost of  an additional 
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It is easy to see that, for a cost allocation rule to satisfy this requirement, 
with  learning  economies present, it must generally  be a function of  all the 
parameters of  the control problem and will, in general, take on negative values 
as  well  as positive  values.  Since the  cost  allocation  rules actually  used  to 
spread fixed costs over the product cycle-by  firms or by the U.S. Commerce 
Department-are  generally  functions only of  the size of  the fixed costs and 
time and produce  only nonnegative  values,  it is essentially  guaranteed  that 
there will be an episode of below-LRAC dumping if learning economies are 
present and the industry is in a symmetric, zero-profit equilibrium.I6 
3.5  Some Further Assumptions 
My next step is to take this simple control model and solve it to explicitly 
derive an individual  firm's  behavior over time. Let the time at which a firm 
switches from full blast production  to constant output production be ts (with 
full blast production  over the entire product life cycle an important possibil- 
ity).  To  sharpen  my  characterization  of  a profit-maximizing  firm's  optimal 
policy, I must address some additional issues. 
16. Define a cost allocation rule g(Z,  t),  where Z is a vector of arguments, t is time, such that 
Define fully allocated average cost (FAAC) by 
FAAC = 
g  + d  + -, 
W  Y 
i.e., current average variable cost plus average fixed cost. We  know that the optimal path must 
contain a capacity-constrained segment and that along this portion of the optimal path 
P  = P'Ny = P'NKwg 
in symmetric industry equilibrium. If price P is always to equal FAAC along this segment, how- 
ever, differentiating the expression for FAAC with respect to t, and setting this equal to the last 
expression, we must at every moment of this interval have 
cg  dg = w&(P'NK  + -  + -)y 
dt  w2  Kw2 
= Kw&[(I  + p)f -  d]. 
Since equilibrium N, and therefore f, will generally be functions of  all the parameters of  the 
optimal control problem,  a function g that satisfies this last equation must generally include all 
parameters of the control problem as arguments, unless wL = 0, in which case g is constant. (In 
this latter case, I note at the end of app. A that all capacity is utilized and output is constant over 
the entire product life cycle.) Thus, if there are learning economies (wE  not equal to zero), a cost 
allocation rule g varying only with F, r, K,  and t cannot satisfy the requirement that P  = FAAC, 
for arbitrary values of the parameters of the control problem, over this capacity-constrained in- 
terval. 
Also, we have already noted that it is possible for P less than current marginal cost to be optimal 
in the presence of  learning economies. (Indeed, the simulations reported below contain examples 
of  such behavior.) Reexamining the definition of  FAAC, it is clear that g must be negative for 
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3.5.1  Learning Economies 
I shall approximate the learning curve by specifying that 
w(E)  = $E‘,  with E(0) = E,,  0 5  E 5  1. 
This gives yielded chips per wafer as a function of experience, E. This func- 
tional form is best regarded  as an approximation:  mass production typically 
starts at initially low yields; yields then rise quickly and flatten out at the end 
of the product cycle in a pattern closer to a logistic curve. Analytic tractability 
is the grounds for selecting this approximation. Note that a “dummy” value E, 
is used as an argument in the function to specify some initial nonzero yield- 
without this constant, yields would stay “stuck” at zero forever.” 
This approximation to the “true” learning curve is shown in figure 3.1. If 
(as is believed in the industry) the “true” learning curve behaves more like a 
logistic  function  in  its  early  stages, my  approximation  somewhat distorts 
yields, output, and pricing in the very earliest portion of the product cycle. 
Defining experience raises additional issues. It is customary to use cumu- 
lative output as a proxy for experience in empirical  studies, and most pub- 
lished empirical studies of learning economies have taken this approach. But 
using  absolute, company-wide production  experience as the determinant of 
any  single facility’s productivity  implies  that  running, say, ten  facilities  in 
parallel  produces the same yields at the end of a period as running  a single 
facility to produce the same output over a much longer period. In the semicon- 
ductor  industry,  it  is  widely  believed  that  improved  manufacturing  yields 
come from two main  sources-iterative  refinements of the operation of the 
production  line (with each new refinement building on previous experience) 
and “die shrinks” (reductions in the feature size for chip designs made pos- 
sible by  improved use of existing process equipment)-that  are iterative and 
sequential in nature.  That is, lessons learned from running a line over some 
period of time are then applied to refine the operation of that line over a sub- 
sequent period. 
However, by this logic, if numerous identical production lines are run in an 
identical fashion over the same period of time, then the same “lessons” are 
being learned, in parallel, on each line, and yields at the end of  the period 
should be no higher than if only a single line were being run. Of course, if a 
new line (one with less experience and lower yields) were put into operation 
after an older line had been running for some time and it were possible com- 
pletely  to transfer the fruits of greater experience across facilities, then the 
maximum experience on any one line would be the “experience” variable de- 
termining production yields.  Because all investment occurs at a single initial 
moment in my simple model, all lines will have identical amounts of produc- 
17. B-K use the same functional form but do not face the “stuck” yield problem because the 
argument in their learning curve is gross wafers processed, not net good chips yielded. The latter 
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tion experience at any subsequent moment in time, and cumulative output per 
facility is the desired measure of experience. 
It is possible that the lessons learned on different lines are not the same ones 
if completely different “experiments” in production refinement are being con- 
ducted  at every production  facility.  If, once again, experience  can be com- 
pletely  transferred  across facilities  and  there  is  no  duplication  in  “lessons 
learned”  in different facilities, then  it might be argued  that company-wide, 
absolute cumulative output, rather than cumulative output per unit capacity, is 
the relevant experience variable.  l8 
One way to parametrize  these differences in the conceptualization of  how 
learning economies work is to define experience as cumulative output divided 
by KY, where y takes on value 0 if absolute, company-wide cumulative output 
is the correct experience variable, 1 if experience per facility (or unit capacity) 




E  ~  with some initial E(0) = E, 
defines E(t).I9  My approach  will be an agnostic one: I will solve the model 
using both 0 and 1 as possible values for y and then ask which seems to predict 
18. Or perhaps even industry-wide cumulative output, if  complete cross-company diffusion of 
the lessons of production experience occurs. 
19. Note that an alternative specification might make cumulative output, or cumulative output 
per unit capacity, the state variable, subject to some initial value, and make this alternative state 63  An Analytic Assessment of “Dumping” in DRAMS 
more empirically plausible behavior. While the “true” value almost certainly 
lies somewhere between these two extremes, it is my prior belief that it should 
be substantially closer to one. With plausible empirical assumptions, it turns 
out that parameter y plays a critical role in defining the nature of an industry 
equilibrium. 
Note that the existing empirical literature on learning curves gives us little 
help in deciding the correct specification. If data on cumulative output from a 
given facility, or aggregate data from a group of  facilities with fixed capaci- 
ties, are used to estimate the relation y  = WK  using (6), we get an equation 
like 
that is, giving the natural log of  total output as a linear function of the natural 
log of cumulative output Q, even if cumulative output per unit capacity is the 
relevant experience  variable. The effects of  capacity size, K,  have been ab- 
sorbed into constant a. Data from different facilities of varying size within a 
single company, or from different companies, along with an additional vari- 
able controlling for capacity size, are required to identify and estimate y. 
An exact solution for E(t)  will be useful in what follows. Substituting (6) 
into the above differential equation giving E, and solving for E as a function 
of time (assuming capacity-constrained output), 
describes the time path of E(t, K)  through time f, the endpoint of the period 
of full blast production. 
3.5.2 
A tested, just-fabricated  “good” die is not yet a finished integrated circuit 
(IC). The dice produced on the wafer fabrication line must then be assembled 
into a sealed package, then subjected to a rigorous final testing process. While 
yields of good, tested chips assembled from “good” dice may also show some 
evidence of a “learning curve,” the effect of learning in this stage of  the IC 
production process is thought to be quite small relative to learning economies 
in the wafer fabrication phase of IC manufacturing. 
I will model assembly and final test yields by assuming a fixed yield of final 
good chips from “good” dice produced on the wafer fab line; that is, v  = sy; 
where v is “net” good, assembled and tested ICs produced from quantity y of 
“gross” good dice yielded by wafer fabrication. If we denote DRAM consum- 
ers’ inverse demand function for finished chips by P(&  Q), then the produc- 
Final Test and Assembly Yields 
variable times K to some power the argument of w, the function giving yield per wafer. Such a 
specification, however, makes initial yield (with no experience) a function  of the scale of capacity 
investment, which is undesirable. (In that case, increasing or decreasing capacity simply to raise 
initial yield on every line will play an entirely artificial role in determining optimal capacity.) 64  Kenneth Flamm 
er’s maximization problem, taking into account assembly  and final test yield 
losses, is to 
with  ky(t) = @wK, 
E  = uwK‘-Y. 
Now,  if  we define an inverse demand  function  for “gross” chips (including 
product ruined in assembly and final test) by 
P[x(t),  Y(0l = P“x(t>, 5Y(t)lS 
and substitute, we get exactly the maximization problem given earlier in equa- 
tion (l),  where 
“(t),  Y(0l = P[x(t),  Y(t)lY(t). 
Thus, after converting net, finished IC demand to a gross (defect-inclusive) 
demand for fabricated chips, we can pose the optimization problem in terms 
of choosing a time path for wafer fab output y  (as opposed to net output 5y) 
and otherwise ignore the additional yield losses in the assembly and final test 
stages of production.20 In interpreting the results, we must only remember to 
divide all “gross” per unit  cost and revenue  measures (like price,  marginal 
revenue, marginal cost, etc.) emerging from the optimization analysis by c, in 
order to get the “net” cost and revenue measures per good unit observed in the 
chip marketplace. 
3.5.3  DRAM Demand 
We must specify a demand function for DRAMs, and an industry structure, 
in order to calculate marginal revenue R,,. I shall assume a constant elasticity 
demand function of the form 
(9)  z  = ape, 
with z aggregate demand for DRAMs, P DRAM price, and an industry made 
up of N identical firms. With this specification, we have 
where parameter u equals the conjectural variation plus one, divided by N, 
the  number of  firms.  With  Cournot  competition,  u is  1/N; with  a constant 
market share cartel, it is 1. 
20. The critical assumption is that all “good chips coming off the wafer fab line incur all the 
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3.6  Model Solution 
Next, I briefly summarize the method used to solve numerically for an op- 
timal policy.  Full details are given in appendix  B. It is useful to categorize 
optimal policies in terms of two possibilities.  One possibility is that full blast 
production is followed by an “interior segment” where a firm is producing at 
less than full capacity. In this case, an optimal policy boils down to picking 
both an optimal capacity K and some optimal time t,  to switch from full blast 
production to constant output production. The other possibility is that the firm 
runs at full capacity throughout the product cycle. In this latter regime, nec- 
essary conditions for the firm determine only an optimal capacity. 
3.6.1 
Appendix B shows that, when the firm produces at less than full capacity, 
an optimal, profit-maximizing  policy  must  set the difference  between  mar- 
ginal cost and marginal revenue equal to SlKY, the value of an additional unit 
of current production  in reducing future production costs over the remainder 
of the product  cycle. Therefore, at the optimal switchpoint  t, to an interior 
segment, we  can solve a differential equation determining 6 and derive an 
equation giving t, as a function of K,  N,  and other parameters of the control 
problem. 
A second equation giving optimal capacity may be derived from equation 
(5). After solving for 6 over both interior and boundary segments and substi- 
tuting into (3,  we have  an expression  implicitly giving K  as a function of 
optimal ts and N. Together with the previous equation, for given N,  and vari- 
ous other parameters, we have two equations in two unknowns. An optima1 t, 
and K pair must solve these two equations. 
3.6.2 
Optimal Output Decisions-with  Interior Segments 
Optimal Capacity-with  No Interior Segment 
In many important cases, the optimal path may not contain an interior seg- 
ment. In this case, ~(t)  will  always equal one. The transversality condition 
will still hold, and, using this boundary value, we can solve the equation of 
motion for 6 given in appendix B. 
Since, however,  this  expression gives  us  optimal  K  conditional  on full- 
capacity utilization over the entire product cycle, we must be careful to ensure 
that such a path is in fact a Cournot equilibrium. In  searching for Cournot 
equilibria,  then, attempts were made to solve both the two-equation  system 
characterizing  an optimal policy with interior segments, for a t, and K pair, 
and the  single equation giving optimal K  assuming  full-capacity  utilization 
throughout the product cycle. Solutions found were then checked as possible 
Coumot equilibria, by perturbing both firm capacity K and switching time t5 
(if relevant) by  .01 in all feasible directions, while maintaining the hypothe- 
sized equilibrium output path for all other firms, and calculating the effect on 
firm profitability (which should necessarily be negative in a Cournot equilib- 
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3.7  Plausible Parameter Values 
The final step in this simulation of firm behavior is to decide on empirically 
plausible parameter values to be used in this model. 
3.7.1  Learning Economies 
While I am unaware of any published  studies of  experience curves in the 
semiconductor industry that control for the effects of varying facility capaci- 
ties  (i.e., estimate y), there  are numerous  published  estimates  of  learning 
curve elasticity  E based on the relation between log output (or log cost) and 
log cumulative output. In DRAMs, there are several published reports of  an 
empirical 72 percent “learning curve,” meaning that current unit cost drops by 
28 percent with every doubling of output, corresponding to E  = .47.2’ 
To  specifically  estimate  the  parameters  of  the  learning  curve  for  IM 
DRAMs, estimates of “typical” wafer yields based on historical data and pro- 
jections for the last four years of  a five-year product life cycle were used to 
derive nonlinear least squares estimates of parameters corresponding to E,, +, 
and  E  in equation (6).22  Parameter y was assumed to equal one; because the 
unconstrained estimate of E, was a small number very close to zero, I imposed 
a value of  .01 for E,.  This was the largest power of ten, which substituted into 
(8)  to constrain  parameter  estimation,  left  other parameter  estimates  un- 
changed  from values produced  by  the unconstrained  estimation  procedure. 
Learning elasticity  E  was estimated to be  .49, while  +KT  had  an estimated 
value of 3  1  .23 
To  further check whether this critical parameter seems to reflect the reality 
of  1M DRAM production  accurately,  actual company-specific quarterly pro- 
duction estimates for the six largest  1M DRAM manufacturers were used to 
estimate learning elasticity  E. “Experience” at time t is given by 
21.  With a constant wafer-processing cost as the only cost element (the model that underlies 
these studies), we have 
unit cost  = - = -Ef.  :  13 
A learning elasticity E equal to .47 is solved from the 72 percent learning curve, since 2-‘  = .72 
(see Noyce 1977; U.S. Congress 1983, 76). On the basis of studies of  production costs for IBM 
bipolar integrated circuits in the 1960s and 1970s, engineers at IBM derived a virtually identical 
71  percent learning curve (see Harding  1981, 652). Webbink’s 1977 survey of  the integrated 
circuit industry notes that interviewed companies believed E to lie generally in the .32-.52  range, 
depending on type of devices (Webbink 1977, 52). Note that Baldwin and Krugman appear to 
have erred in interpreting the report in U.S.  Congress (1983) of a 72 percent learning curve-their 
basis for assuming that E  = .28 when it actually corresponds to E  = .47! 
22. Since the unit of time is the (assumed five-year) product cycle, yields after two years cor- 
respond to time .4, after three years .6, etc. The data are given in VLSI Research (1990, adden- 
dum A). The data in this addendum correspond to a “typical” wafer fab running twenty-five hun- 
dred  wafer  starts  per  week,  run  at  full  capacity  over  the  product  life  of  the  1M  DRAM 
(conversation with Dan Hutcheson,  19 August 1991). 
23. If instead y was set equal to zero, the estimate of  C$  would have risen from thirty-one to 
thirty-six, but the estimated E would not have changed. 67  An Analytic Assessment of “Dumping” in DRAMS 
where Q(r) is cumulative production through time t, and K is capacity. If E, is 
small relative to Q(t)/Ky, then 
must hold true.24  If we choose a period of time in which capacity is approxi- 
mately  constant and fully  utilized, then  the  expressions  in K in  the  above 
equation  may  be regarded  as part of  firm-specific coefficients on two vari- 
ables-a  constant and the inverse of cumulative output-and  E as the coeffi- 
cient of  the log of cumulative output in a regression equation. The equation 
also provides a simple test for the hypothesis that y equals zero since, in that 
case, the coefficient  of  inverse cumulative output should be constant across 
firms. 
The above  equation was estimated  using  data on cumulative  output  and 
current production for the six largest 1  M DRAM producers (Toshiba, Hitachi, 
Fujitsu, NEC, Mitsubishi, and Samsung) over the quarters from  1988:3 to 
1989:2, a period of booming demand when trade press accounts suggest that 
DRAM output was  capacity  constrained. The point estimate  of  E  was  .65, 
corresponding to a 36 percent learning curve, confirming other evidence sug- 
gesting  substantial  learning  Constraining  the coefficient of  in- 
verse cumulative output to be the same for all companies reduced the estimate 
of  E to .5 1, but a formal statistical test of  the corresponding  hypothesis that 
y  = 0 was inconclusive.26 In summary, all available data seem to point to a 
24. Making use of the fact that In( I  + x) = x approximately, for x small. 
25. The data used are Dataquest estimates of quarterly output. Reported shipments by Motorola 
have been added to Toshiba’s output and reported shipments by Intel to Samsung’s output (since it 
is believed that most Motorola chips were fabricated by Toshiba and Intel chips “private-labeled’ 
Samsung output during this period). The regression estimated was In  y  = u, f E In  Q + b,l/Q, 
with coefficients u and b varying by producer. The estimate of  E  was .52, with a standard error 
of .07. 
26. The results were as follows: 
Variable 
Unconstrained  With Constraints 
Estimated  Standard  Estimated  Standard 
Coefficient  Error  Coefficient  Error 
Ln cum. output 







.67  .17  .52  .07 
-  .77  1.62  -  .13  .05 
.27  .42 
.21  .46 
.13  .30 68  Kenneth Flamm 
large yield elasticity with respect to production experience, close to .5, and at 
least some evidence suggests that absolute cumulative output is not an appro- 
priate choice of  “experience” variable.?’ I shall use .49 as my estimate of  F, 
3 1 as my estimate of +. 
3.7.2  The Demand for 1M DRAMs 
There  is  little reliable  information  on the  price elasticity of  demand  for 
DRAMs. Wilson, Ashton, and Egan (1980, 126-27)  estimate that this price 
elasticity ranges between -  1.8 and  -2.3  on the basis of  a graph of  log bit 
price versus log bits sold. Finan and Amundsen  (1986a, C-18; 1986b, 321) 
report a -  1.8 price elasticity on the basis of  a simple regression  of log bit 
price on log bits  sold worldwide.  Neither of  these estimates makes  any at- 
tempt  to control for the effect of variation  in the overall  level of economic 
activity  on chip demand. Flamm (1985, 130-31)  estimates an overall price 
elasticity  of  demand  for  semiconductors  used  in  the  computer  industry  of 
-  1.6, assuming  a quality  adjustment equivalent to the improvement  in bit 
density observed in DRAMs and chip use in computers fixed in proportion to 
computer output. 
To  get as reliable an estimate as possible for  1M DRAM demand,  I esti- 
mated a loglinear demand function giving quantity shipped of 1M DRAMs as 
a loglinear function of  real  1M DRAM price, real prices for 64K and 256K 
DRAMs (as possible  substitutes),  real  GNP, and a linear trend  included  to 
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The test statistics for the hypothesis of  a common coefficient on inverse cumulative output- 
F-statistic  =  1.89  with 5 and 11 df; Wald chi-square statistic = 9.45 with 5 df-lead  us to reject 
the hypothesis at the 10 percent, but not reject at the 5 percent, significance levels. 
27. Estimation of a learning elasticity requires data on either current and cumulative output or 
current average variable cost and cumulative output. The dubious practice of  using price as a 
proxy for current unit cost-as  in  Dick  (1991)-will  almost certainly lead to incorrect results 
since the simple models of pricing behavior reviewed above suggest that market prices will di- 
verge from either current average or marginal cost. 
28. The data on quantity cover quarterly worldwide shipments from 1985:2 to 1989:4 by “mer- 
chant” producers and are unpublished Dataquest estimates. Data on DRAM prices are also unpub- 
lished quarterly Dataquest estimates of average sales price over this same period. Real (deflated) 
GNP and the implicit GNP price deflator are taken from Council of Economic Advisers, Economic 
Report of  the President (various years). 69  An Analytic Assessment of “Dumping” in DRAMS 
tor, rebased  so that the fourth quarter of  1989 was equal to 1, was used to 
deflate all monetary values to “real” 1989:4 levels. Deflated GNP and substi- 
tute DRAM prices were converted to indices taking on value 1 in 1989:4; as a 
result, the constant in a regression equation may be interpreted as the “level” 
of  DRAM demand corresponding to  1989:4 values for these variables. The 
estimated regression equation (with estimated standard errors underneath the 
various coefficients) was 
ln(Q) = 22.97 +  1.23 ln(P,,)  +  .63 ln(P256K)  - 1.47 ln(P,,) 
(1.02)  (2.43)  (1.68)  (.49) 
+ .29T -  1.75 ln(GNP) 
(.27)  (36.26) 
and the estimated price elasticity about -  1.5. Dropping the linear time trend 
variable as a proxy for transitional “generational shift” effects had little effect 
on the estimated own price elasticity, raising it to -  1.55. Interestingly, drop- 
ping both GNP and the time trend substantially raised the estimated price elas- 
ticity, to -  2.1. 
On the basis of these results, -  1.5 was used as an estimate of 1M DRAM 
own price elasticity f.3, and the value 190,000 was used as an estimate of prod- 
uct life-cycle demand “level” a.29  To transform this demand function to a de- 
mand for “gross” fabricated dice (prior to test and assembly losses), it was 
assumed that net output of tested and finished chips equals .9 times good dice 
produced in wafer fab.30  With the functional form assumed, a simple transfor- 
mation of a  is merely substituted for its original value in order to derive the 
appropriate inverse demand f~nction.~’ 
3.7.3  Cost Parameters 
Based on estimated  1989 values found in VLSI Research (1990), I  esti- 
mated I  (capital cost per unit product cycle wafer capacity) to be $240. Vari- 
able cost per wafer processed  (including materials, labor, and wafer probe 
test) was estimated  to be  $390.32  Test  and assembly costs were assumed to 
equal $0.23 for the IC package and about $0.52 for assembly and final test, 
for a total of $0.75 per device 
29. Exp(22.97) multiplied by 20 (= 190,000 million) gives demand that would be observed at 
a 1M DRAM price of $I .OO over a twenty-quarter (five-year) product cycle, given real output and 
substitute price levels prevailing in 1989:4. 
30. For estimated test and assembly yields in this general neighborhood, see VLSI Research 
(1990, addendum A) and ICE (1988,7-16-7-17), 
31. That is, P(ez)e = (@VY/~)~’PC  = (Ny/a’)”P,  where a’  = at-(’ 
+
 PI. 
32. VLSI Research (1990, addendum A) puts material and labor cost at $380 per wafer pro- 
cessed; I add on a $10.00 wafer probe test cost based on ICE (1988,7-9). 
33. The package cost comes from conversations with Dan Hutcheson of VLSI Research; the 
assembly cost is estimated to range from $0.07 to $0.20 offshore, or from $0.10 to $0.50 per 
device onshore (in the United States, Europe, and Japan), in ICE (1988, 7-16-7-18).  I have used 
a “typical” value of $0.32. Final test cost is estimated to be $0.20 per unit in ICE (1988, 7-18), 
for a grand total of $0.75 for package, assembly, and final test. 70  Kenneth Flamm 
Overhead is normally a significant part of  semiconductor cost. On the basis 
of  aggregate historical data for the period  1981-87,  I have assumed $0.36 in 
general, administrative,  and selling costs for every dollar of direct manufac- 
turing  Thus, the estimates for c, d, and r given above were marked up 
an additional  36 percent. Table 3.1 shows the assumed empirical parameter 
values used. 
3.8  Baseline Simulations 
Table 3.2  gives the optimal values of  f and K derived from numerical solu- 
tion of  the optimal control problem described above. The roots of  a system of 
two nonlinear equations in two unknowns (eqq. [Bl] and [B2] in app. B), or 
one equation in one unknown  (in the case where “full blast” production over 
the entire product life cycle is the optimal policy, eq. [B2’] in app. B), were 
sought. Table 3.2 also shows a “gross rent,” that  is, profits  net of  all costs 
other than fixed entry cost F:  received by each producer. The columns of table 
3.2 correspond to different assumed numbers of firms in the industry, the rows 
to differing assumptions about parameter gamma (y), which defines the expe- 
rience variable relevant to learning economies. 
Since identical firms are assumed to make up the industry in equilibrium, 
one may “close” the model by assuming free entry, that firms enter the indus- 
try up to the point where gross rent per firm just covers the fixed cost of entry 
(F). Because we  are restricted  to an  integer  number  of  firms,  I define  the 
equilibrium as the number of firms where one more entrant reduces rent per 
firm below entry cost F: As a consequence of the integer number of  firms, the 
symmetric equilibrium  so defined  will  generally  be characterized  by  some 
small, positive rent (net of entry cost F). 
I shall assume that the fixed entry cost (primarily total R&D costs for the 
1M DRAM) that must be invested prior to mass production of  the 1M DRAM 
runs between roughly $250 and $500 million. Thus, for y  = 1, if entry costs 
F amounted to $250 million, we would expect to find fourteen identical firms 
in the industry,  each with  facilities capable of producing 4.66 million wafer 
starts over a five-year product life cycle. With entry costs F of $500 million, 
we would expect nine producers, each with the capacity to produce 6.94 mil- 
lion product cycle wafer starts. In either case, the optimal policy  would  in- 
volve full blast production  over the entire life cycle. Thus, one immediate 
observation that emerges from table 3.2 is that, with y  =  1 (which I argued 
earlier  is  a heuristically  appealing specification),  small differences in fixed 
entry costs can make a large difference in the industrial structure of the in- 
dustry (number of firms observed). The same cannot be said for y much less 
than 1. 
34. The data on which this calculation is based are found in ICE (1988, 7-20). I have excluded 
R&D and interest expense as elements of “overhead.” 71  An Analytic Assessment of “Dumping” in DRAMS 
Table 3.1  Empirical Parameter Values 













“Level” of life-cycle demand for assembled and tested 
units at $1 .OO per chip 
Price elasticity of demand 
Share of good, yielded chips as fraction of good dice 
after assembly and final test 
Level of demand for “gross” fabricated dice (including 
units rejected at final test) 
Learning curve wafer fab yield “level” parameter 
Initial “experience” at time 0 
Experience elasticity of wafer fab yield 
(Gamma) parameter determining experience variable 
Overhead expense per dollar direct manufacturing cost 
Package, assembly, and final test cost per fabricated unit 
Fabrication cost per processed wafer 
Capital cost per unit life-cycle wafer-processing capacity 
190,OOO  million units 







$0.75 X  (I + m) 
$390 X  (I + m) 
$240 X  (1 + rn) 
Table 3.3 summarizes some characteristics  of industry  equilibria derived 
from table 3.2 under differing assumptions about fixed entry costs E  I have 
taken F  as either $500 or $250 million; these values  are best interpreted  as 
bracketing  a range of  feasible values.  Alongside the equilibrium number of 
firms, the Hirschman-Herfindahl  index of concentration is also 
In order to get at the issue of  whether “dumping” is observed, I have calcu- 
lated observed prices and various cost concepts at one hundred equally spaced 
points over the product life cycle. One useful cost concept is current short-run 
marginal cost (SRMC), which  in my  model  happens  to be constant at any 
moment in time, coincides with average variable cost, and is equal to d + 
c/w. This is the incremental cost saved when output is reduced by one unit. 
Another  important cost  concept  is  fully  allocated,  long-run  average  cost 
(LRAC). To  define this concept, I have assumed straight-line depreciation in 
spreading capital and fixed entry costs over the product life cycle: an equal 
amount of these fixed costs is allocated to every moment in time. Capital and 
fixed entry costs per unit are then calculated  by dividing fixed costs corre- 
sponding to time t by the number of  units y(t)  produced at that moment. Add- 
ing average variable cost to average fixed cost, I then have LRAC = d + 
cl w + F/y + rluw. Multiplying LRAC by output at any instant, and sum- 
ming these costs at every instant over the product cycle, gives the total cost of 
producing some time-varying path of output over the entire product cycle. 
Table 3.3 shows that, assuming y  = 1, price falls short of  short-run mar- 
35. This index is defined as HHI  = c:=,~:,  where s, is the market share of company i. The 
index ranges in value from 1,  with monopoly, to 0, with a competitive industry composed of an 
infinite number of equally sized firms. In the special case of N identical firms, this index is just 
equal to 1/N. Table 3.2  Baseline Simulation Results 
Number of Firms 
I  2  34  5  6  7  8  9  10  II  12  13  14  15  16 
gamma = 1 
K (mil. wafer starts) 
Gross rent (mil. $) 
gamma = .9 
K  (mil. wafer starts) 
IS 
Gross rent (mil. $) 
gamma = .8 
K (mil. wafer starts) 
IS 
Grosb rent (mil. $) 
gamma = .7 
K (mil. wafer starts) 
IS 
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15  13.07 
I  I 
-  258  -  707 
15.11  13.22 
.88  .9 
-619  -1,074 
15.04  13.23 
.75  .77 
-924  -1,406 
14.46  12.86 
.53  55 
-1,120  -1,697 
13.12  11.83 
.33  .34 
-796  ~  1,543 Table 3.3  Characteristics  of Symmetric Industry Equilibria 
F = $500 Mil.  F  = $250 Mil. 
Segments of Product Cycle 
No.  Hirschman-  No.  Hirschman- 
Segments of  Product Cycle 
Firms  Herfindahl  P<SRMC  P<LRAC  Firms  Herfindahl  P < SRMC  P < LRAC 
gamma = 1 
gamma  = .9 
gamma  = .8 
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ginal cost over the first 3 percent of the product life cycle and falls short of 
average cost over roughly the first third of the product cycle. With y  = 0, by 
way of contrast, price is less than marginal cost only at the very beginning of 
the product cycle; price is less than average cost over two distinct periods-at 
the very beginning  and over roughly  the  second quarter of  the product  life 
cycle. Indeed, given  my  assumptions about other parameter  values,  for all 
values of y price falls short of marginal cost only at the very beginning of the 
product  cycle.  Further  perusal  of  this  table  makes  clear,  however,  that 
the timing of periods of sales at less than average cost is quite sensitive to the 
specification of the experience variable-depending  on y, such episodes can 
occur at the beginning of the product cycle, the middle, or the end or in some 
combination of these sequences. 
Table 3.3 also shows that the value of y makes a big difference in the struc- 
ture of a symmetric industry equilibrium. With cumulative output per facility 
(y =  1) the relevant experience variable,  a relatively  large number of  firms 
(nine to fourteen) populate the industry. With y much below .9,  no more than 
three or four firms make up the industry. 
Figure 3.2 shows the path of price, marginal revenue, marginal cost, and 
average cost over time in the case where  entry costs are $250 million and 
y  = 1. Figure 3.3 shows the time path for these variables over the product 
cycle when y  = 0 instead. 
Ironically, the specification of firm behavior in the B-K model-full  blast 
production over the entire product cycle-turns  out to be optimal if parameter 
y is close to 1 (see table 3.2). The irony arises because the B-K model also 
specifies absolute cumulative output (y = 0) as the experience variable, and, 
given realistic choices for other parameters, optimal behavior would then re- 
quire cutting  back  production  to levels below  capacity  after about the first 
third of the product cycle. 
3.8.1  Reality Checks 
How plausible  are these simulations, and do they suggest anything about 
the realism  of  various  assumptions about  parameters?  One straightforward 
way to evaluate the model is to compare the predicted industry structure with 
observed industry structure. Figure 3.4 shows Hirschman-Herfindahl concen- 
tration indexes constructed from Dataquest estimates of annual producer ship- 
ments  of  various  generations of  DRAMs.~~  For virtually  all generations  of 
36. These indexes are calculated from unpublished Dataquest estimates of DRAMs shipped 
from 1974 through the end of  1989. Note that there were two distinct varieties of  16K DRAM, 
one with a single-voltage power source, the other requiring dual voltages; each is treated as a 
separate product in this figure. In calculating concentration indexes for 1M DRAMs, I have allo- 
cated Motorola-labeled product to Toshiba (since virtually all Motorola’s product over this period 
is believed to  have  been  assembled  from  Toshiba-fabricated dice or  produced  by  a Toshiba- 
Motorola joint venture); 1M DRAMs bearing the Intel label have been assigned to Samsung since 
it is believed that virtually all Intel’s sales over this period were “private labeled” Samsung prod- 
uct. Neither of these adjustments has a particularly significant effect on the pattern of concentra- 






0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9 
Time 
MR  p  ______  MC  --- AC - 
3.2  Time profile of costs and prices, simulated equilibrium with gamma 
(MC = short-run marginal cost; AC = long-run average cost; P = price; 
= marginal revenue). 
DRAM, the concentration  index declines sharply from an initially very high 
level, as one producer after another comes on line with volume production. 
The index then levels off near .  1 ,  rising sharply at the end of the product cycle 
as  producers  drop the product  line  one after another.  Although  the  early 
phases of the 256K and 1M DRAM may have been somewhat more concen- 
trated than in earlier generations’ life cycle, they too seem destined to follow 
this pattern eventually. 
Comparing the Hirschman-Herfindahl  indexes associated with my simula- 
tions to the pattern depicted in figure 3.4, only the results associated with the 
specification of cumulative output per facility (y = 1) as the experience vari- 
able fit reasonably closely. Note that my assumption of symmetric firms means 
that the associated Hirschman-Herfindahl index of concentration must be con- 
stant over time. While conceding that my model is at best an approximation 
to reality, I conclude that only a y close to 1 yields predicted behavior that is 
reasonably close to industrial reality. 
Another cut at this question may be had by comparing predicted with actual 
paths for DRAM prices over time. To  do so, I have assumed that a five-year 
product cycle for the 1M DRAM effectively began in  1988 (although small 
quantities were produced as far back as late 1985, quantity production did not 77  An Analytic Assessment of “Dumping” in DRAMS 
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Fig. 3.3  Time profile of costs and prices, simulated equilibrium with gamma 
= 0 (MC = short-run marginal cost; AC = long-run average cost; P = price; 
MR  = marginal revenue). 
really ramp up until  1988). Figure 3.5 charts the actual behavior of one set of 
estimates of  large volume  contract prices for  1M DRAMS in the U.S. and 
Japanese markets through September 1991, along with simulated 1M DRAM 
price levels associated with an assumed y equal to I and 0, re~pectively.~’  Note 
that the period from 1988 through the first quarter of  1989 was a period of 
extreme shortage in real-world  DRAM markets,  while  the period  after late 
1989 was one marked by lackluster demand. Given that the early portion of 
my empirical approximation to the learning curve is probably poorer than in 
later periods (see the discussion above) and that my assumption of symmetric 
firms is probably least appropriate in the early stages of  the product cycle, I 
am not surprised to find that the very earliest part of  the predicted time path 
for prices  seems least accurate.  All  things considered,  the  simulation  with 
y  =  1 seems to do a reasonable job of tracking real  1M DRAM prices! The 
simulation with y  = 0 clearly does not. 
Thus, two pieces of evidence-observed  and predicted  concentration in- 
dexes and the time path of DRAM prices-seem  to suggest that a value of 
y  close  to  1 provides  significantly  more  realistic  predictions  than  a  value 
close to 0. 
A final point to consider is that, historically, the industry folklore holds that Hirschrnan-Herfindahl Indexes 
0.5 
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Fig. 3.5  Historical pricing compared with simulated equilibria 
DRAM producers have traditionally run their plants at full blast while keeping 
them in operation, a behavior that is consistent with the simulations presented 
here. However, beginning in mid-1989, Japanese DRAM producers have an- 
nounced production cutbacks for DRAMs. This raises three issues that I men- 
tion but do not explore in this paper. First, DRAM capacity may be shifted, at 
some cost, to production of other types of integrated circuits, a possibility not 
explicitly incorporated into my model. Second, DRAM demand is notoriously 
cyclical, and the consequences of shifts in demand for optimal producer be- 
havior is, again, not explicitly explored here. Third, production of DRAMs 
after  the  conclusion of  the  1986 Semiconductor Trade  Arrangement  was 
clearly affected by political constraints, may have led to a degree of collusive 
behavior among producers, and otherwise involved political economic factors 
not incorporated into my model. 
3.8.2  The Dumping Issue 
Given empirical values deemed to be plausible in the case of  1M DRAMs, 
the exercises portrayed in tables 3.2 and 3.3 suggest that a short-run marginal 
cost test for dumping, as a screening test for potentially predatory behavior, is 
likely to give only “false positives” (pricing below current marginal cost ab- 
sent strategic behavior)  in the very earliest stages of the product cycle. One 80  Kenneth Flamm 
might interpret this to mean that a marginal-cost-based dumping test might be 
defensible if  some sort of “exception” to a marginal-cost-based pricing stan- 
dard is granted when a new product is first introduced. But it is not clear how 
robust this conclusion is to changes in empirical parameters used in my simu- 
lations; further sensitivity analysis might shed greater light on this question. 
The same cannot be said for an average cost test for predation. Depending 
on parameter  values,  episodes of below-average-cost  pricing can pop up in 
virtually  any part of  the product life cycle, even when producer behavior is 
entirely nonstrategic. 
Indeed,  while the  simulations depicted in tables 3.2 and 3.3 all show an 
episode of below-average-cost pricing at the beginning of the product cycle, 
possibly  followed  by  a  later  episode, it  would  be  incorrect  to assert  that 
below-average-cost pricing will always necessarily  be observed at the begin- 
ning of the product life  Figure 3.6 shows that, by artfully changing a 
single  parameter  (in  this  case,  by  greatly  raising  initial  yields,  making 
E, = 500), assuming y = 1 and F  = $250 million,  one arrives at a sym- 
metric industry equilibrium where price never falls below marginal cost and 
price falls below average cost only during the last half of the product cycle.39 
3.9  Conclusions 
In recent years, pricing below a constructed long-run average cost has be- 
come the principal grounds for applying the “dumping” laws to U.S. imports 
of foreign products. While this practice has little obvious economic defense, 
it is possible to argue that a test based on marginal cost might serve as a useful 
screen for potentially predatory behavior by  foreign exporters. However, in 
the presence of learning economies, such as are thought to be present in many 
high-tech industries,  including semiconductors,  below-marginal-cost  pricing 
can be rational even in the absence of strategic behavior, such as predation. 
In this paper, I have developed  a more realistic  model of pricing over the 
life cycle of  a product in which both fixed costs and learning economies are 
significant.  Using  empirically  plausible  parameters  for production  of  1M 
DRAMs,  and  assuming  nonstrategic  producer  behavior,  I  have  found  that 
below-marginal-cost pricing is likely to be observed only in the very earliest 
stages of the product cycle. 
The analysis has also shed considerable light on other facets of pricing and 
production over the product life cycle. A specification of learning economies 
37. These data are monthly averages of  Dataquest estimates of  average contract prices in these 
markets.  The data are reported  in  Computer Reseller News (various issues).  For more on the 
strengths and weaknesses of  these data and a thorough discussion of  the segmented spot and 
contract markets in which DRAMs are sold, see Flamm (in press, a). 
38. Dick (1991, 144-46)  proposes this behavior. 
39. The symmetric equilibrium depicted in this figure corresponds to eighteen producers, each 
with a capacity of  3.88 million life-cycle wafer starts, producing full blast over the entire product 
cycle. 81  An  Analytic Assessment of  “Dumping” in DRAMS 
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based on cumulative output per facility as the “experience” variable was found 
to yield results that were considerably more realistic than other possible-and 
popular-specifications.  Contrary to popular belief, below-average-cost pric- 
ing does not necessarily have to occur near the beginning of the product cycle. 
The model presented here appears to produce fairly realistic predictions of 
industry structure and pricing behavior when used with empirically plausible 
parameters. Interesting extensions of  this work include considering the possi- 
bility of strategic, noncooperative behavior on the part of  producers as well as 
cooperative or collusive behavior. Policy issues that might be explored include 
the effect of various government policies on industry structure and some mea- 
sure of aggregate national welfare.40 
Appendix A 
Let y(t)  be company’s output at time t,  x(t) output of other companies, F fixed 
cost of entry, R[y(t),  x(t)] company’s revenues at time t, d assembly and test 
40.  These issues are explored in Flamm (in press, b). 82  Kenneth Flamm 
cost per chip, c wafer-processing  cost, u(t) utilization rate at time t, K fixed 
capacity,  r capital cost per unit capacity,  w yielded good chips per wafer, Q 
cumulative  company  output,  y  experience  specification  parameter 
(0 I  y 5 l), and E “yield relevant” experience (E,, + Q/Ky). 
1. The general problem described in the text is 
b’{R[~(f),  4f)l -  F - dy(Q -  4r)K -  rK)dft, 
where  y(t) = u(t)w(E)K, 
‘-y,  WE > 0, 
.  Y(t) 
E  = -  = u(t)w(E)K  s.t. 
K’ 
UC[O, 11,  w > 0. 
Form the Hamiltonian (suppressing the arguments of functions for notational 
simplicity) 
Y  H  = R -  F - dy - cuK -  rK  + 6- 
K’  ’ 
with 
where Rv  denotes dR/dy, marginal revenue. By the maximum principle, choose 
u(t) to  maximize H, given  u  E  [0, 11, with 6(1) = 0 (transversality condi- 
tion). There are three possible cases to consider. 
O<u<l, - 
dU 
At an interior maximum, we also have a second-order necessary condition: 
d2H 
= R,,(Kw)’ I  0. 
6 
8  = -  Rv -  d  + -)wEK  < 0,  i  KY 
cs 
w  Ky 
u=O,  Rv-d--+-SO,  S=O. 83  An Analytic Assessment of “Dumping” in DRAMS 
Together  with  the  transversality  condition,  this  implies  that  6 2 0 every- 
where. 
Along an interior segment, that is, possibility (Ala), 
c6 
w  Ky’ 
R  =d+--- 
Y 
-CU-j  w&‘  -  y  = 0,  -i  w 
which means that R, is constant along an interior segment. 
optimal parameter K must be chosen to satisfy (see Leitmann 1966, 98-100): 
The above analysis holds for any given K. Full optimization requires that 
dt = 0,  1’  aH[W,  K, u*(Q,  E*(t)l 
dK 
where u*(t) is the optimal utilization rate and E* the trajectory of experience 
variable E corresponding to u*(t). Then 
1 
ax  6 
R, - d  + --  + R-  - y-y  -  cu - rdt = 0. 
Ky  )”  aK  “aK  K’fY 
I will assume nonstrategic behavior-the  firm perceives ax/dK = 0-so 
w  Ky 
The expression in brackets above  = 0 if  u interior,  5  0 if  u  =  1, and I  0 
ifuz = 0. 
Note that this shows that the expression in brackets must be positive, and 
u  = 1, over some interval if  optimal K  > 0 (and any output is produced). 
The identical trajectory of output (and variable profit) could otherwise be pro- 
duced at lower cost by choosing some smaller K,  then choosing utilization 
rate ii(t) = (K/k)u(t)  < 1. 
2. The above is perfectly general. To explicitly solve for an optimal path, I 
add additional structure and make the following further assumptions: (i) In- 
dustry inverse demand  (and firm revenue  function R)  and learning function 
w  are  twice  continuously  differentiable  functions  in  all  their  arguments. 
(ii) There are N firms. (iii) Industry revenues are an autonomous, strictly con- 
cave function of industry output. 
Let R(z) be  industry  revenues,  z(t) industry  output  (z[t] = x[t] + y[t]). 
Then R(z) = P(z)z, where P(z)  is industry inverse demand. 
I will assume Rzz = Pl‘z  + 2P‘ < O for z 2 O (i.e., R strictly concave). SO 
2P‘ 
P” < --  for z 2 0. 
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I have also assumed that R[y(t),  x(t)] is autonomous, not a function of time 
other than through x(t) and y(t).  Since output is a perfectly homogeneous com- 
modity, with a single market price assumed, 
R[Y(t),  m1  = P(x + YlY, 
dz 
RV = P'-Y  p+ P = P'(1 + A)y  + P, 
dY 
with A (= dr/dy)  the conjectural variation perceived by the firm. I shall regard 
A as a constant varying between 0 and N - 1. These limits parametrize A as 
lying between two useful limiting cases of industrial organization: (i) A  = 0 
with Cournot competition; (ii) A  = N - 1 with a constant market share car- 
tel made up of N identical firms. 
I will be assuming A  = 0 for the moment, but I will develop my analysis 





* Y  + 2P'-  = (1 + A)[P"(l + A)y  + 2P'] 
using  (A2a). Now,  consider  two  cases:  (i)  Under  Cournot  competition, 
A  = 0, since 
5  1, then  I -  Y  -(1  + A) > 0,  and  R,, < 0. 
Z  Z 
(ii)  Under  N identical  firms  in  a  collusive,  fixed-market-share  cartel, 
A=N-l, 
In these two cases, firm revenue R  is strictly concave in y, with R,,, < 0 
everywhere. Now,  since functions R  and w  are assumed twice continuously 
differentiable  in  their arguments, so too will  be  the  Hamiltonian  H, with 
H,,, = R,(KW)~  < 0. H  is strictly concave in u. For given K,  then, the nec- 
essary  conditions for optimal u are also sufficient to guarantee  that  we  are 
maximizing H.  More important, the strict concavity of H in u and the constant 
bounds constraining feasible u mean that we may invoke an appropriate theo- 
rem to conclude that optimal u is continuous in other arguments of H.41  Since 
41. For example, a result proved by Debreu, found in Lancaster (1987, 349-50),  or a theorem 
due to  Fiacco, cited in McCormick (1983, 245-46).  More directly, we may note that the strict 
concavity of H in u means that, at every moment, the u(f)  that maximizes H  is unique. Since the 
set of feasible values from which u(t)  is chosen is compact, we may invoke a theorem (6.1) from 
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the other arguments of H  are continuous functions of time, u must also be a 
continuous function of time as well. 
Note also that u(t) is a continuously  differentiable function of time within 
an interior segment. This is a consequence of the linearity of E in u and the 
strict concavity of the Hamilt~nian.~~ 
Next I restrict discussion to symmetric industry equilibria, that is, with the 
industry made up of  identical firms.  In this case, I will show that, along an 
interior segment of such an equilibrium, i < 0. 
We  already know (see [Ald]) that, along an interior segment, 
(RJ = 0 
d 
dt 
= -[P’(l  + A)y  + PI 
= y[P”(l + A)Ny  + P’(l + A)  + P’N]. 
Is it possible that the expression in brackets equals zero? If 
P”(1 + A)Ny + P’(1 + A)  + P‘N = 0, 
P‘ 
p=  -  > - -(2) 
z  z 
since  1  + N/(1  + A)  2  2. But this  contradicts  (A2a)  and our assumption 
that R,, < 0. So we must have j, = 0. 
Now 
Y  y  = UKW, y  = UKW + UKW -  = 0, 
“K. 
which can only be true if  U < 0. 
Since u is continuous over time, when u  = 0, it cannot jump to 1. Indeed, 
u  cannot even  become positive  since u  < 0 as  soon  as u > 0. So, when 
u  = 0, the optimal policy must remain u  = 0. 
If we add the further assumption that R,(O) exceeds current marginal cost at 
time  0  (as  must  be  true  with  constant  elasticity < -l),  then,  because 
y/z  = I/N, 
42. Consider optimal control u*(r)  over some interior segment f, < t i  I,. Because of the strict 
concavity of the Hamiltonian, a local interior maximum of H  must also be a global maximum of 
H with no constraints on control u(t).  That is, optimal control u*(f)  over this interval must also be 
the optimal control for the problem 
maxu~,l~~[R(r.  y) - F - dy -  cuK - rqdt, 
subject to the initial and terminal conditions that E(t)  take on the values at times t,  and f2 associated 
with optimal control u*(t)  in the original problem, but with no bounds on control u(t).  As Fleming 
and Rishel(1975, corollary 6.  I,  p. 77) note, the linearity of the equations of  motion in the control 
variable and the concavity of the Hamiltonian are sufficient to guarantee that the optimal control 
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and (Alc) cannot hold, it can never be optimal for u  = 0. 
Note the role of learning economies in this model. If wE  = 0 everywhere, 
(no learning) 6 must be constant and equal to zero and optimal u constant over 
the product cycle. Optimal capacity choice implies that RY - d -  ciw must 
be greater than zero, and therefore u  = 1. The first-order conditions then re- 
quire that K be chosen so variable profit generated by a marginal unit of capital 
[R, - d - c/w]w  just covers the cost of capital (r),  and all available capacity 
is fully utilized over the entire product life cycle. 
Appendix B 
Specification of the Demand Curve 
Let  inverse  demand be  given  by  P  = (z/a)”P with  z  = x  + y  total  in- 
dustry output and P the price elasticity of demand. Consider industry sales, 
given by 
and note that limz+, R, = m. 
Now, marginal revenue for any individual firm is given by 
dx 
with A  = -  defining the conjectural variation: 
dY 
if  X  = N -  1, we have a constant market share cartel; 
if  A  = 0, we have Cournot competition. 
In  addition, I assume that  the industry  is made up of N  identical firms.  In 
symmetric industry equilibrium, each firm has market share yiz = liN. Let 
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RY = P(; +  11, 
where  u = 
1, cartel; 
1/N, Cournot. 
Thus, in an industry made up of N identical firms, 
Specification of Learning Economies and Output 
Let w  = 4EE,  with 
Y 
K’ 
E=-,  E(O)=E,,  05~51,  OSySl. 
Initial yield (45)  is independent of capacity choice. We are mainly interested 
in two specific cases: y  = 0 (learning depends on absolute production expe- 
rience) and y = l (learning depends on experience per unit capacity, or facil- 
ity). Theny = 4EEuK. 
a) Over the intervalfrom 0 to rs, where u  = 1, 
Solving this differential equation, we have 
We also know 
which can be rewritten as the linear monic differential equation 
6 + fl(t7 ~6  = f,<tj  K), 
with 
f,(t, K)  = ~4E(r,  K)E--lKI-~  , f,(~  K)  =  -[Ry(t,  K) -  dlfl(t,  K)K’. 
Solving  for  6,  for  some  t  in  the  interval  (0,  rJ,  given  boundary  value 
S(t,)  = S,$, we have 88  Kenneth Flamm 
JtS  Jt\ 
6(t) =  el-,  (T)dT 
Define function  ti,([,  t,, K, 6,)  by the right-hand side of  this equation. With 
some difficulty, and a great deal of tedious algebra, we can then integrate this 
expression and have 
6,(L  ts,  K, 6,J 
E(t, K)  [=I 
6)  Over the interval  from tT  to 1,  optimal u is set such that y(t, k) = y(r,, k), 
that is, constant output. E(t,,  k)  and y(t,, k)  are given by expressions in the last 
section. Over the interval from r,y to I,  then, 
so E(t, k) = (t - tJym  + E(t,, K);  E=-  '  Y(t.9 K) 
KY  '  KV 
E(t, K) = (t -  tJ$Ws,  K)'KK'-',  + EO,, K) = E(tS,  K)[1 + Qk  t,, 01, 
where  Q(t,  r5, K) = $E(ts, K)F-lK1-v(t  - tJ, 
incremental experience from time t, to time t, relative to experience at t,; 
Conditional on assumed switchpoint ts, the solution to this differential equa- 
tion can be written as 
6(t) - 6(1) = /f,(T; is,  K)dT, 
or,  making  use  of  the  fact  that  &(I) = 0 (transversality  condition),  define 
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cKY  -  - 
"(t,,  K) + +K1-Yt - t,)E(fq,  K)"]' 
+[E(5,  K) + W-Yl - rs)E(t,, K)"]" 
+E(t,,  cKY  K)" {  [I + Q<t7  t,, K)1'  [1 + Q(l, 4,  K)1' 
cKY  - 
1. 
-  1 
-  - 
In particular, we can solve for 6,(ts; tr,  k),  that is, the value of 6 at t,, which, 
given some assumed ts,  solves the equation of motion over an interior segment 
and the transversality condition at time  1.  In this special case, we have 
Solution of the Model 
Our specification has ruled out the possibility that optimal u  = 0. The op- 
timal  path  for  u  will  consist  of  a  capacity-constrained  (u =  1) segment 
through time tx,  possibly followed by  an interior segment. For the moment, 
assume that t, < 1. 
Case 1: t, < 1 
At ts,  we also know that u(t) will be entering an interior segment, so 
must be true at t,. Thus, for given K,  optimal t,  must satisfy 
or, substituting, 
-C 
+[E(ts,  K) + $K'-'(1  -  t,)E(t,, K)']]" 
-d=0. 
(B1) 
This is just the condition that marginal revenue equal current marginal cost at 
terminal time  1. If K  is chosen to nonstrategically  maximize profits, optimal 
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Since the expression  in brackets  is 0 after ts and u is  1 before ts,  this can be 
written as 
K)W + [[[Ry(t, K) -  dl+E(t, K)" 
6 
K'  + -+E(t,  K)€(1 - y) dt - cfs - r  = 0. 
We may substitute for 6 with the function 6,  and S,,  described earlier. Noting 
that 
over the interval from t,7  to  I, we can solve analytically for the first integral 
above, so, substituting, 
- ct, -  r  = 0. 
An optimal t, and K choice, then, must solve equations (Bl) and (B2). 
Case 2: t, = 1 
The other possibility is that f, = 1 and producers fully utilize available ca- 
pacity throughout the product  life cycle. Since there is no interior segment, 
equation (Bl) does not have to hold at ts.  Instead, the transversality condition 
means that S(tJ = 0, so S,(t,  1, K, 0)  gives the value of  S(t) at any time t. 
Incorporating this into the first-order condition for optimal K,  I then have 91  An Analytic Assessment of “Dumping” in DRAMS 
which can be solved for optimal K. 
and (B2) for optimal (rs, K)  and (B2’) for optimal K (assuming rs  =  1). 
Industry Profits 
up of N identical firms can be calculated as (for given optimal r, and K) 
In searching for Cournot equilibria, then, attempts were made to solve (Bl) 
Total rents per firm, gross of fixed entry cost F, earned in an industry made 
or 
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Comment  Yun-Wing Sung 
During  my flight to the conference, I was reading Newsweek  magazine,  in 
which I came across Michael Boskin’s comment on potato chips and computer 
chips:  “Potato chips,  computer chips,  they’re all  chips. What’s  the  differ- 
ence?’  I  agree wholeheartedly with  Boskin  because  I know  nothing  about 
computer chips, and I beg your forgiveness if I mix them up with potato chips. 
I enjoy Kenneth Flamm’s paper very much. Flamm’s model has the advan- 
tages  of both  the  Spence model,  which  explains  forward  pricing,  and the 
Baldwin and Krugman model, which gives a realistic time path of  prices. In 
Flamm’s model, firms first make some optimal capacity investment. Initially, 
they run that capacity  full blast  and then switch to  a policy of maintaining 
constant output but decreasing  utilization  of capacity.  In other words, firms 
exploit their monopoly  power at the latter stages of the product cycle. The 
driving force behind the time paths of falling prices and decreasing capacity 
utilization is learning economies. 
Although  Flamm’s  model  undoubtedly  represents  a  big  step forward  in 
modeling, it does not take into account the effects of entry, and this is a signif- 
icant weakness. According to the product-cycle theory, firms producing high- 
tech products typically enjoy temporary monopoly powers at the first stage of 
the product  cycle, and they earn  substantial  economic profits.  Such profits 
attract imitators, and the economic profits are competed away. In contrast to 
Flamm’s model, firms exploit their monopoly powers at the initial rather than 
the latter stages of the product cycle. The fall in prices over time is a result of 
entry as well as learning economies. 
In the case of  the time path of prices, the effects of entry and learning econ- 
omies work in the same direction: both factors lead to a fall in prices. How- 
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ever, in the case of  the time paths of  capacity utilization and exploitation of 
market power,  the two factors work in opposite directions. Entry leads to a 
weakening of  market power and increasing capacity utilization over time, but 
learning economies have the opposite effects. 
It might be argued that, unlike potato chips, entry in the computer chips 
industry is much more difficult and learning economies in the computer chips 
industry  much more significant,  with the result  that the  effects  of  learning 
economies on capacity utilization and exploitation of  market power predomi- 
nate over those of  entry. However, this is an empirical matter that cannot be 
presumed. Moreover,  both  casual  empiricism  and the product-cycle  theory 
suggest that entry is an extremely important factor that cannot be ignored. 
Besides entry, temporal optimization on the part of buyers would also coun- 
teract the decrease in capacity utilization over time. Buyers expect the prices 
of  chips to fall over the product cycle, and they postpone their purchase as a 
result. This shifts purchases  from the initial stages to the latter stages of  the 
product cycle and tends to increase capacity utilization over time. It should be 
noted that Flamm’s model assumes a constant elasticity of demand over time 
and thus cannot take into account the postponement of purchases on the part 
of buyers. 